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Abstract
New horizontally-differentiated goods involving product-specific net-
work effects are quite prevalent. Consumers’ market-wide preference
for each of these goods typically is initially unknown. Later, as sales
data begin to accumulate, agents learn market-wide preferences, which
thus become common knowledge. We study such a market, pinpoint-
ing the factors which determine whether the market-wide preferred
firm reinforces its lead as time elapses, penetration and under-cost
pricing prevail, and first- or last-mover effects in market-wide prefer-
ences occur.
JEL classification numbers: L11, L13.
Keywords: Network effects, horizontal differentiation.
1 Introduction
NEW HORIZONTALLY-DIFFERENTIATED GOODS involving product-spe-cific network effects often reach the market almost simultaneously
without consumers and firms knowing which is favored by the majority
of consumers. Recent examples are the consoles market where Nintendo,
Sony and Microsoft compete, or the storage-media market were Imation and
Iomega compete with the SuperDisk and Zip formats, respectively. In these
markets, network effects are present since consumers’ utility increases with
the number of other users.1 Quite frequently, such goods are incompatible,
implying that network effects are product specific. Thus, consumers who
bought the less well-liked good may find themselves stranded with the mi-
nority format.2 Even though when such goods are introduced, neither con-
∗We are grateful to Pedro Pita Barros and Cesaltina Pires for useful suggestions. We retain
sole responsibility for any shortcomings.
1In the examples cited, due to game sharing (a direct network effect) and variety (an
indirect network effect), and file swapping, respectively.
2A fact well known to Beta videotape-system patrons.
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sumers nor firms know which most consumers will prefer, as sales data be-
gin to accumulate, market-wide preferences become common knowledge.3
Also, a particular good may be preferred by the majority of consumers be-
cause of differences intrinsic to the goods, in which case such an advantage
lasts over time, or as a result of an initially more-successful advertising and
marketing campaign, in which case it may change.
For the sake of realism, to all these issues one must add horizontal
differentiation since consumers idiosyncratically differ in their valuation of
the competing goods’ characteristics.4
We consider a model where two firms compete in prices over two peri-
ods by selling horizontally-differentiated goods involving product-specific
network effects. Either product may be preferred by the majority of con-
sumers due to the non-observable realization of a random variable com-
mon to all consumers. This unobservable common term adds to the usual
idiosyncratic horizontal-differentiation term to determine gross surplus
which, added to the network benefit, yields willingness to pay. Thus, ini-
tial consumers who enjoy one good more than the other do not know if
the majority of other consumers also show the same relative preference,
or if this is instead an idiosyncratic trait. Afterwards, second-period con-
sumers become aware of which product enjoys a market-wide preference
upon observing first-period sales. We thus capture the idea that with time,
market-wide preferences become common knowledge.
Considering two periods, as well as profit-maximizing and information-
processing firms, allows us to capture strategic price decisions in this setup
where market-wide preferences must be learned. Not surprisingly, penetra-
tion pricing prevails as long as network effects are felt, and under-cost pric-
ing may occur depending on the relative strength of product differentiation
vs. the network effect.
We find that the firm that obtains the larger market share in the first
period reinforces its lead in the following period if and only if the network
effect is significant enough compared to the degree of product differenti-
ation. This finding contrasts sharply with that of Arthur and Ruszczynski
(1992), who show that a firm’s increase in market share, when it finds itself
3Imation discontinued the production of its SuperDisk drive perhaps as a consequence
of learning that most consumers preferred the Zip storage format.
4Thus, we explicitly capture in a dynamic setting the tension between horizontal differ-
ences that tend to split the market among firms, and network effects that induce the oppo-
site tendency.
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with a bigger installed base, depends on the discount rate.
By considering a variant of the model with two independent realizations
of the non-observable random variable, each affecting consumers buying in
one period, we are able to compare the case where a good’s preference
by the majority of consumers is unchanging in time to the case where
such preference may vary. The former depicts an advantage inherent to
the good (e.g., its design or performance) whereas the latter describes an
extrinsic and possibly fleeting advantage (for instance, resulting from a
more-successful introductory campaign). Surprisingly, this has a striking
impact on the previous paragraph’s conclusion. We find that in the latter
case, when a firm obtains the same market-wide preference in both periods,
it always reinforces its lead.
This variant of the model also allows one firm to be preferred by the
majority of consumers in one period, while the other firm benefits from
the very same advantage in the following period. In this case, we show that
a first-mover advantage prevails, a result that contrasts with that of Katz
and Shapiro (1986).5 Insofar as advertising budgets for promoting new net-
work goods aim at affecting market-wide preferences, this result provides
a rationale for the often-observed concentration of spending before and
during the launching of the new product, as opposed to later.
By considering yet another variant of the model where the realization of
the common term is known from the outset (i.e., which good is preferred
by the majority of consumers and by how much is common knowledge
resulting, for instance, from advanced testing reported by the media), we
show that the parameters’ range for which the firm with a larger installed
base after the first period increases its dominance in the second period
is smaller. Thus, one concludes that firms and initial consumers ignoring
which product enjoys a market-wide preference enlarges the set of circum-
stances under which one firm continually increases its market share as time
elapses.
Related issues have been discussed by a plethora of authors.6 However,
almost all studies assume within-period consumer preferences’ homogene-
ity, implying that the same firm captures the whole market in each pe-
riod while excluding horizontal-differentiation issues. Instead, we assume
within-period consumers’ heterogeneity while also departing from the lit-
5See Liebowitz and Margolis (1994, p. 143) who criticize this type of result.
6See Farrell and Klemperer (forthcoming) for a survey of the extant literature.
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erature in assuming that consumers and firms initially do not know (other)
consumers’ valuations with certainty, a realistic feature of paramount im-
portance when network effects are present.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model.
In Section 3, we solve it. In Section 4, we present the main results. Finally,
Section 5 briefly concludes. All material not needed for a quick under-
standing of the model, its solution and main results is found in several
appendices.
2 The Model
We consider a model with two periods. In each period, N consumers reach
the market and must decide which good to buy. All have unitary demand.
Regardless of when they reach the market, all consumers begin using the
good after the second period.7 Two firms, A and B, sell two differentiated
goods endowed with product-specific network effects, i.e., incompatible,
which are also denoted A and B, respectively. We assume that firms com-
pete in prices, which they set in each period. Without loss of generality, let
the cost of serving an additional consumer be zero.
The final size of network A is given by N (x1 + x2), where xi ∈ [0,1]
is the proportion of consumers who choose network A in period i = 1,2.
Each consumer enjoys a surplus resulting from the network effect, S, which
increases linearly at rate E > 0 with the final size of the network, i.e., S =
E × N (x1 + x2).8 Thus, E is a constant that measures the intensity of the
network effect.
In each period, consumers choose the good that offers the greater ex-
pected net surplus. To determine it, consumers must consider (i) the gross
surplus excluding the network effect, (ii) the expected network benefit which
depends on the expected network size and (iii) the price.
For each consumer, the difference between the gross surplus yielded by
network A and that yielded by network B is given by random variable v(·).
A consumer with a positive value of v(·) obtains a larger gross surplus
by choosing network A rather than B. Otherwise, it obtains a larger gross
surplus by choosing network B.
7This straightforwardly models situations where the two buying-periods’ time lengths
are insignificant when compared to the overall lifetime of the goods. We thus exclude the
durable goods’ issue, not juxtaposing it to the coordination issue at the root of network
goods’ markets. This modeling option is widespread in the literature.
8Thus, we adhere to Metcalfe’s law.
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Random variable v(·) equals the sum of two components, random vari-
able z, common to all consumers, and random variable a(·), specific to
each consumer, i.e., idiosyncratic:
v (xi, z) = a(xi)+ z.
The value of z measures how much, on average, all consumers prefer
network A to B. We assume it to have uniform distribution with support
[−w,w]:
z U (−w,w) .
Random variable a(·) measures how much a particular consumer id-
iosyncratically prefers network A to B. It is built as follows. Assume that
consumers are uniformly distributed along the segment [0,1] with A lo-
cated at x = 0 and B located at x = 1. Let t measure the degree of product
differentiation between the two goods. A consumer located at x = 0, ceteris
paribus, prefers network A to B by an amount t, while a consumer located
at x = 1 prefers network B to A by the same amount. Therefore, a(xi) is
uniformly distributed with support [−t, t]:
a(xi) = t − 2txi, i = 1,2
xi U (0,1)⇒ a U (−t, t) .
We assume that each consumer knows the density functions of xi, a, z
and v(·), but can only observe the value taken by v(xi, z) in its particular
case.9 If a consumer observes v (·) taking a positive value, it knows that
its gross surplus of choosing A exceeds that of choosing B by the amount
v(·). However, it does not know if this is caused by a high realization
of z, in which case most consumers also prefer network A to B, or a low
realization of xi, in which case it is she or he that idiosyncratically enjoys
network A more than B.10
After defining e ≡ E × N, the net surplus of period-i consumers from
buying good A is given by
C + v (xi, z)+ e× (x˜1 + x˜2)− pAi ,
while the net surplus of buying good B is given by
C + e× (2− (x˜1 + x˜2))− pBi ,
9In plain words, each consumer knows how much it prefers one particular network over
the other, all else equal.
10As we will see, second-period consumers circumvent this informational problem by in-
ferring the realization of z from first-period sales.
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where x˜1 and x˜2 represent the expected first- and second-period market
shares of network A, and C is a constant sufficiently large for all the market
to be covered in equilibrium.
3 Solving the Model
This section contains the computations needed for solving the model and
is thus of limited interest to readers interested only in results. For these, it
is enough to know that equations (11) and (14) represent first- and second-
period demand, whereas equations (15), (12) and (13) represent first- and
second-period optimal prices when consumers and firms maximize utility
and profits, respectively, while optimally learning the extent of market-wide
preferences from sales data available at the end of the first period.
In order to choose a network, first-period consumers must compare the
net surpluses yielded by networks A and B. This determines the first-
period indifferent consumer, and thus first-period demand. First-period
consumers indifferent between the two networks are such that:
C + v (a (x1) , z)+ e (x˜1 + x˜2)− pA1 = C + e (2− (x˜1 + x˜2))− pB1 
t − 2tx1 + z + e (x˜1 + x˜2)− pA1 = e (2− (x˜1 + x˜2))− pB1 
x1 = p
B
1 − pA1 + z + t − 2e+ 2e (x˜1 + x˜2)
2t
. (1)
First-period demand is a function of the expectation of the networks’ mar-
ket shares, i.e., x˜1 and x˜2, which we must thus compute.
In order to obtain the estimated demand for network A in the first pe-
riod, x˜1, we assume that all consumers are rational insofar as estimated
demand equals expected demand:
x˜1 = E [x1|v] = p
B
1 − pA1 + E [z|v]+ t − 2e+ 2e (x˜1 + x˜2)
2t

= p
B
1 − pA1 + E [z|v]+ t − 2e+ 2ex˜2
2 (t − e) , (2)
where E [z|v] is the expectation of z by a first-period consumer who has
observed realization v (xi, z). Because the expected value of z is not the
same for all consumers, they can have different expectations of the demand
for network A in the first period.
This expected demand results in a unique and stable equilibrium when t
exceeds e. If instead e > t, this expected demand is based on an non-unique
and unstable equilibrium, in which case there are two other stable equilibria
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where all consumers choose one of the two networks. The reason is that
when the network effect dominates the degree-of-product-differentiation
effect, consumers may prefer to coordinate on all buying the same good
rather than splitting and choosing the good which they prefer. In the end,
the equilibrium turns out to be similar to one in which there is no product
differentiation at all. Since we want to analyze the case where product dif-
ferentiation also drives the results, we assume that t > e for now. However,
once we take into account the interaction between periods, this restriction
will be strengthened.11
In order to determine first-period demand, we also need to compute
the second-period expected demand, x˜2. For that, one must model second-
period consumers’ behavior as well as firms’ optimal second-period pricing.
Second-period consumers and firms, having observed the decisions of
first-period consumers, namely actual first-period quantity demanded x∗1 ,
correctly infer the value of z.12 Therefore, they determine exactly second-
period demand.
In order to choose a network, second-period consumers compare the
net benefit of adopting each network. A consumer indifferent between the
two networks is such that:
C + v (a (x2) , z)+ e
(
x∗1 + x2
)− pA2 = C + e (2− (x∗1 + x2))− pB2 ,
which yields
x2 = p
B
2 − pA2 + z + t − 2e+ 2ex∗1
2 (t − e) , (3)
where x∗1 is the observed market share of network A at the end of the first
period.
First-period consumers do not know the realization of z, x∗1 and second-
period prices. Thus, they cannot determine the actual second-period de-
mand, but only the expected demand:
E [x2|v] = x˜2 =
E
[
pB2 |v
]
− E
[
pA2 |v
]
+ E [z|v]+ t − 2e+ 2ex˜1
2 (t − e) . (4)
First-period consumers determine expected second-period prices while
assuming that these are chosen by profit-maximizing firms. To calculate ex-
pected second-period prices, E
[
pA2 |v
]
and E
[
pB2 |v
]
, we consider firm A’s
profit-maximization problem in the second period, while bearing in mind
11See Appendix A for details.
12Appendix B explains this inference process in detail.
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that firms, too, have inferred the realization of z at the end of the first
period:
Max
pA2
pA2 x2N = pA2
pB2 − pA2 + z + t − 2e+ 2ex∗1
2 (t − e) N.
The f.o.c. equals
pB2 − pA2 + z + t − 2e+ 2ex∗1
2 (t − e) N − p
A
2
N
2 (t − e) = 0 
pB2 + z + t − 2e+ 2ex∗1 = 2pA2 ,
whereas the s.o.c. equals − Nt−e and thus is strictly negative due to the as-
sumption that t > e.
By symmetry we have for firm B:
pA2 − z + t − 2ex∗1 = 2pB2 .
By solving the system of equations formed by these first-order conditions,
we obtain the prices charged in the second period:

pA2 = 13z + t + 23ex∗1 − 43e
pB2 = −13z + t − 23e− 23ex∗1 .
(5)
First-period consumers compute expected second-period prices:
E
[
pA2 |v
]
= 13E [z|v]+ t + 23ex˜1 − 43e
E
[
pB2 |v
]
= −13E [z|v]+ t − 23e− 23ex˜1.
(6)
By replacing these in (4), we obtain
x˜2 =
t − 43e+ 23ex˜1 + 13E [z|v]
2 (t − e) . (7)
We now have two equations, (2) and (7), which together determine x˜1 and
x˜2 as a function of all known parameters, first-period prices and E [z|v].
By solving this system of equations, we obtain
x˜1 = 12 +
3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ E [z|v]
(
t − 23e
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 , (8)
and
x˜2 = 12 +
1
2
e
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ E [z|v] t
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 . (9)
Appendix A makes it plain that only for t > 1.577e do we have a unique
and stable intermediate equilibrium without consumer bunching on a net-
work. Thus, we tighten the previously-made assumption t > e to this more
stringent inequality.
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We have finally computed x˜1 and x˜2 and are now ready to obtain first-
period demand. By replacing x˜1 and x˜2 in (1), one obtains
x1 = 12 +
z
2t
+ 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 +
E [z|v] e (2t − e)
t (3t2 − 6te+ 2e2) . (10)
At this point, one must tackle the inference problem encapsulated in
E [z|v], i.e, to compute the expectation of z by a consumer who observed
a given realization of v (xi, z). Given the assumptions made, the support
of v is [−t −w, t +w]. We now postulate that there are always some con-
sumers who value network A more than B while others have the opposite
valuation ordering when firms charge the same price and all consumers
expect both networks to attain the same final size. This amounts to assum-
ing that, whatever the realization of z, variable v can assume positive and
negative values depending on the value of a(xi). This is tantamount to
imposing t > w.13
We show in Appendix C how, given v , first-period consumers form their
expectation of z. Also, Appendix C makes it plain that first-period demand
is estimated by first-period consumers as follows:
(i) For consumers who observe a realization of v ∈ [t −w, t +w]:
x1 = 12 +
z
2t
+ 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 +
(v +w − t) e (2t − e)
2t (3t2 − 6te+ 2e2) .
(ii) For consumers who observe a realization of v ∈ [−t +w, t −w]:
x1 = 12 +
z
2t
+ 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 . (11)
(iii) For consumers who observe a realization of v ∈ [−t −w,−t +w]:
x1 = 12 +
z
2t
+ 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 +
(v + t −w)e (2t − e)
2t (3t2 − 6te+ 2e2) .
Finally, though the first-period demand curve is estimated differently by
different consumers depending on their observed realization of v(·), Ap-
pendix C makes it plain that (11) is the relevant demand curve in a symmet-
ric equilibrium such that pA1 = pB1 . This has a very intuitive explanation.
Begin by viewing the first case above as representing consumers who are
quite “optimistic” about network A, the intermediate case as comprising
13Thus ensuring that the equilibrium values of x1 and x2 lie on [0,1], as will be made
clear shortly.
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the “middle grounders,” and the last one the “pessimists.” Appendix C
shows that “middle grounders” always determine market demand.14
To determine optimal first-period prices, firms have to take into account
their effect on second-period demand and prices. The lower is a firm’s first-
period price, the greater will be its quantity demanded, and thus, due to the
network effect, the greater will be its second-period demand and associated
optimal price. For this reason, we must determine second-period demand
and optimal prices as a function of first-period prices only.
By replacing (11) in (5), we obtain
pA2 =
1
3
z + t − e+ 1
3
ez
t
+
e (t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 , (12)
and
pB2 = −
1
3
z + t − e− 1
3
ez
t
−
e (t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 . (13)
By replacing (11), (12) and (13) in (3), we obtain
x2 = 12 +
1
3z + 13 ezt
2 (t − e) +
1
2
e
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 . (14)
The profit maximization problem of firm A is15
Max
pA1
ΠA = E [x1 (pA1 , pB1)NpA1 ]+ E [x2 (pA1 , pB1)NpA2 ] .
pA1 is not a random variable, but p
A
2 is because its value depends on the
realization of z. Therefore, we can write
Max
pA1
ΠA = E [x1 (pA1 , pB1)]NpA1 + E [x2 (pA1 , pB1)pA2 ]N.
We can now easily compute a symmetric equilibrium.16 By replacing (11),
(12) and (14) in the objective function, we obtain
ΠA = E

1
2
+ z
2t
+ 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2

NpA1 + E



1
2
+
1
3z + 13 ezt
2 (t − e) +
1
2
e
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2

×
×

1
3
z + t − e+ 1
3
ez
t
+
e (t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2



N.
14Interestingly enough, even though “middle grounders” always determine actual
demand—i.e., indifferent consumers are necessarily “middle grounders”—they may be
wrong in their estimate of z. To see this, consider the case where the realization of z is
extreme, namely w, in which case “optimists” are nearer to correctly estimating market-
wide preferences (see Appendix C for details).
15The absence of discounting of second-period profits is in keeping with the remarks made
previously in fn. 7.
16Note that firms are symmetric at the beginning of the game.
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The first-order condition equals
1
2
N + 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 N −
3
2
t − e
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2Np
A
1 −
1
2
e (t − e)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2N −
−1
2
e (t − e)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2N +
1
2
2e2 (t − e)
(
pA1 − pB1
)
(3t2 − 6te+ 2e2)2 N = 0.
In a symmetric equilibrium we have pA1 = pB1 . Therefore,
1
2
− 3
2
t − e
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2p
A
1 −
e(t − e)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 = 0.
Some more manipulation finally yields
pA1 = t −
5
3
e− 1
3
e2
t − e = p
B
1 . (15)
Equilibrium first-period prices depend positively on the degree of product
differentiation and negatively on the extent of the network effect. A de-
crease in price increases expected network size. Thus, the stronger is the
network effect, the greater is the impact of a decrease in price on each pe-
riod’s demand and so the lower is the first-period price which firms want
to charge.
The second derivative of the problem at hand equals
1
2 (t − e) −18t
2+36te−11e2
(3t2−6te+2e2)2
. This second derivative is negative if t < 0.376e
or t > 1.623e. Since we have already seen that only for t > 1.577e do we
have a unique and stable equilibrium without full bunching on a network,
we must retain t > 1.623e as the relevant constraint.
4 Results
4.1 Evolution of market shares
4.1.1 Initially-unknown time-invariant market-wide preferences
We want to check whether or not in a market with network effects and
initial uncertainty concerning the market-wide preferences of consumers,
the firm which obtains the larger market share in the first period tends to
increase it in the next period.
Demand in both periods, given by (11) and (14), in a symmetric equilib-
rium collapses to
x1 = 12 +
1
2
z
t
x2 = 12 +
1
3z + 13 ezt
2 (t − e) .
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The first-period demand does not depend on the network effect because
the expected size of both networks is the same.
Simple computations show that a firm increases its market share in the
second period, x2 > x1, iff t < 2e. Recalling that we restrict our analysis to
t > 1.623e, we conclude that the firm that obtains the larger market share
in the first period will increase it in the second period iff t ∈ (1.623e,2e).
In other words, market dominance is reinforced if and only if the network
effect is strong enough vis-a`-vis the degree of product differentiation.
The reason is that in the first period and when choosing its price, the
preferred firm does not know that it has the greater demand since z is
still unknown. So, it will charge a price lower than would have been opti-
mal. In the second period, once firms infer the realization of z, the firm
which realizes it has the higher demand will price accordingly.17 This mis-
pricing correction tends to reduce the firm’s market share. Its impact on
second-period equilibrium quantity demanded is proportional to the de-
gree of product differentiation, t. To see it, note that if t is rather close
to zero, the goods are very close substitutes, implying that any attempt by
the preferred firm to significantly increase price would result in the loss of
many sales.
Concurrently, consumers realize which firm is preferred by the major-
ity of consumers, i.e., they learn the realization of z. This tends to in-
crease that firm’s second-period market share due to the network effect
and, by the same token, reduce its opponent’s. If the network effect is
strong enough, the second effect dominates the first and the lead obtained
by one firm in the first period is reinforced in the second.
4.1.2 Unknown time-variable market-wide preferences
In Appendix D, we modify our model by replacing variable z by variables
z1 and z2 in the first and second periods, respectively. We further as-
sume that z1 and z2 are independent. This allows us to consider the case
where the market-wide advantage initially enjoyed by one firm may be non-
permanent. Interestingly, if one firm happens to enjoy the same advantage
in both periods, i.e. z1 = z2 = z, then this firm’s market share always
increases. In this case, neither the mispricing correction described pre-
viously, nor the network effect associated with second-period consumers
17Of course, the same applies mutatis mutandis to the other firm after it realizes that it is
less favored by consumers.
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learning the true value of z takes place. Thus, firms compete for second-
period consumers exactly as they did for first-period ones, except that the
initially-preferred firm now starts with the advantage of a larger installed
base. Thus, it obtains an even larger percentage of second-period con-
sumers than it did of first-period ones.
4.1.3 Known time-invariant market-wide preferences
In Appendix E, we develop another variant of our model where the real-
ization of z is common knowledge, and thus immediately observable by
first-period consumers. This accounts for the possibility that market-wide
preferences may be apparent from the outset, due, for example, to techni-
cal reviews of the new products appearing in the press. We use it to show
that z not being initially observable increases the range of circumstances
under which the firm that gains a larger installed base gets to increase its
market share subsequently.
In fact, when z is common knowledge from the outset, the interval of
parameters for which the firm that obtains the greater market share in the
first period increases it in the following period is reduced from t < 2e to
t < 1.694e. In this case, rational expectations ensure that the final size
of each network is known in advance by all consumers, and is thus the
same for first- and second-period consumers. Therefore, there is no reason
for the firm that obtains the greater market share in the first period to
increase it in the final period due to the network effect. The reason why we
still have a positive trend in market share is firms’ strategic pricing over
time. To see this, suppose that we also impose that prices should be time
invariant. Then, prices, as well as expected network size, are the same in
both periods, and so consumers will split between networks in the same
manner in both periods. Therefore, each firm will have the same market
share in both periods. In this case and despite the network effect, the firm
that obtains the larger market share in the first period will not increase it
in the following period.
4.2 Strategic Prices
4.2.1 Penetration pricing
In a market with network effects, firms may want to act strategically by
charging different prices in different periods even when costs and the de-
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mand they face are the same. To examine this issue, we compare the prices
charged in each period. From (12), the second-period price charged by firm
A in a symmetric equilibrium equals
pA2 = t − e+
1
3
z + 1
3
ez
t
,
and thus, the average price charged in the second period equals
E
[
pA2
]
= t − e.
From (15), firm A’s first-period price equals
pA1 = t −
5
3
e− 1
3
e2
t − e .
The first-period price is smaller than the second-period average price.
4.2.2 Under-cost pricing
It is easy to show that under-cost pricing may occur. Simple computations
show that pA1 = t − 53e − 13 e
2
t−e > 0 iff t > 2e. Recall that cost is nil. Thus,
if the degree of product differentiation is significant vis-a`-vis the network
effect’s strength, firms will optimally price above cost in order to exploit
“their” idiosyncratic clients at the cost of a reduced first-period installed
base. Otherwise, if the network effect’s strength is significant vis-a`-vis the
degree of product differentiation, firms will follow an under-cost pricing
strategy.
4.3 First-mover Advantage
We now determine whether in a model where market-wide preferences may
change over time, there is a first- or last-mover advantage in market-wide
preference. To do so, in Appendix D we consider a particular realization
profile of z1 and z2 such that, in the first period, firm A is the preferred
one (z1 = K > 0) while in the second period the symmetric situation oc-
curs (z2 = −K < 0). We conclude that if there are network effects—i.e.,
e > 0—then the firm which is preferred by consumers in the first period al-
ways obtains a larger total market share at the end of the two periods than
the firm preferred in the second period. Therefore, in this model there is
always a “first-mover advantage,” in contrast to the “last-mover advantage”
instances found in Katz and Shapiro (1986).
The reason for this is that in a market such as ours, in which individuals
cannot anticipate the future evolution of the network, a firm that obtains
14
a large market share in the first period benefits from the network effect in
the following period because agents observe that advantage. On the other
hand, the firm that gains advantage in the second period does not benefit
from the network effect in the first period because that advantage was not
anticipated by consumers.
5 Conclusion
We developed a two-period, differentiated-goods model of a market with
network effects and consumer and firm uncertainty concerning consumers’
overall valuation of the goods. We show that the firm that obtains the
larger market share in the first period increases its market share in the last
period if and only if the network effect is significant enough compared to
the degree of product differentiation as long as market-wide preferences
are time invariant. Strikingly, if market-wide preferences can vary over
time, then the firm with a larger installed base will always reinforce its lead
if it keeps enjoying the same market-wide preference.
The idea that, in a market with network effects, the firm that obtains a
larger market share in the initial period tends to subsequently increase it
is expressed by Varian and Shapiro (1999, pp. 174): “The new information
economy is driven by the economics of networks ( . . . ) positive feedback
makes the strong get stronger and the weak grow weaker.” We qualify this
observation in two respects. Most of the literature assumes homogeneous
consumers and no uncertainty concerning market-wide preferences. Thus,
the firm that wins in the first period immediately obtains 100% market
share. There are no gradual dynamics in which success begets success and
failure breeds failure, a feature that our model shows.
More importantly, we show that this is not always the case, depending
on the relative strength of the network effect vis-a`-vis product differentia-
tion, as well as whether market-wide advantages are irreversible or fleeting.
Also, we show that uncertainty over market-wide preferences increases the
set of circumstances under which leaders amplify their market-share ad-
vantage.
Moreover, we show that in this context, firms do engage in penetration
pricing and may engage in under-cost pricing. Finally, we find that the
model shows a first-mover advantage concerning the market-wide prefer-
ence term, z. This provides a rationale for allocating advertising budgets
15
preferentially to pre-introduction promotion activities rather than to post-
introduction advertising, insofar as these are mechanisms affecting, and
possibly reversing, market-wide preferences.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we show that a unique and stable equilibrium without
bunching of all consumers on a network exists if and only if t > 1.577e,
i.e., iff the degree of product differentiation is large enough compared to
the intensity of the network effect.
For expositional clarity, we begin by showing that in a model with only
one period, a unique and stable equilibrium without full bunching exists if
and only if t > e.18 The result for the two-period model in the main text
then follows easily by analogy.
In a one-period model, the indifferent consumer is given by
C − tx1 + z + ex˜1 − pA = C − t (1− x1)+ e (1− x˜1)− pB,
from which we obtain the following demand function
x1 = p
B − pA + z + t − e
2t
+ e
t
x˜1. (A.1)
A consumer’s estimate of x1 is then given by:
x˜1 = p
B − pA + E [z|v]+ t − e
2t
+ e
t
x˜1
= 1
2
+ p
B − pA + E [z|v]
2 (t − e) . (A.2)
If t < e, the intermediate expectation of x1 given by equation (A.2),
namely 0 < x˜1 < 1, is not the only one possible. Two other extreme ex-
pectations concerning x1, namely x˜1 = 0 and x˜1 = 1, can consistently be
entertained by consumers as part of an equilibrium. This is so because
t < e implies that all consumers—including those located at the far-off end
of the horizontal-differentiation line—attach a higher value to belonging to
the network to which all other consumers belong than to staying with their
preferred network. In this case, equilibria involving complete bunching
may occur.
Moreover, the intermediate equilibrium is unstable when t < e. If con-
sumers hold an expectation slightly different from that given by (A.2), they
will all migrate towards one network. Equation (A.1) makes this clear if one
notes that t < e ⇒ et > 1—the latter being the coefficient affecting x˜1 on
the r.h.s. of (A.1)—implies ∂x1∂x˜1 > 1.
18This is also the relevant interval in a model with two periods in which first-period con-
sumers do not take into account the impact of their decisions on second-period consumers.
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The extreme cases—in which all consumers are driven by the network
effect to coordinate on consuming the same good—are tantamount to hav-
ing no product differentiation at all.
We now consider the two-period model treated in the main text. Here,
first-period consumers know the impact of their decisions on their second-
period counterparts. The condition for a unique and stable intermediate
equilibrium is now more demanding since an increase in the expected value
of x1 leads to an increase in the expected value of x2 due to the network
effect. This, in turn, leads to an increase of the expected value of x1. Thus,
the incentives for all consumers to choose the same network are stronger,
and so the condition for a unique and stable intermediate equilibrium is
more demanding.
The first-period indifferent consumer is determined by
C − tx1 + z + e (x˜1 + x˜2)− pA1 = C − t (1− x1)+ e (2− (x˜1 + x˜2))− pB1 ,
from which we obtain
x1 = p
B
1 − pA1 + z + t − 2e+ 2e (x˜1 + x˜2)
2t
,
and finally
x˜1 = p
B
1 − pA1 + E [z|v]+ t − 2e+ 2ex˜2
2 (t − e) . (A.3)
From (7) in the main text, we have
x˜2 =
t − 43e+ 23ex˜1 + 13E [z|v]
2 (t − e) .
After replacing x˜2 in (A.3), we obtain
x˜1 =
pB1 − pA1 + E [z|v]+ t − 2e+ 2e t−
4
3 e+ 13E[z|v]
2(t−e)
2 (t − e) +
4
3e
2
4 (t − e)2 x˜1.
Now, the intermediate equilibrium is unique and stable iff the coefficient
affecting x˜1 on the r.h.s. of the previous equality is less than 1, i.e.,
4
3 e
2
4(t−e)2 <
1. This is the case iff t < 0.423e or t > 1.577e.
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Appendix B
In this appendix we show that second-period consumers and firms deduce
the realization of z upon observing x1, provided a condition on accuracy
of beliefs is met.
A first-period indifferent consumer is such that
C + a(x1)+ z + e (x˜1 + x˜2)− pA1 = C + e (2− (x˜1 + x˜2))− pB1 .
Thus, first-period demand equals
x1 = p
B
1 − pA1 + z + t − 2e+ 2e (x˜1 + x˜2)
2t
. (B.1)
The estimate of x1 by first-period consumers equals
E [x1|1, v] ≡ x˜1 = p
B
1 − pA1 + E [z|1, v]+ t − 2e+ 2e (x˜1 + x˜2)
2t
,
where E [x|1, v] denotes the estimate of random variable x by a first-
period consumer who has observed realization v (xi, z). Thus,
x˜1 = p
B
1 − pA1 + E [z|1, v]+ t − 2e+ 2ex˜2
2 (t − e) . (B.2)
A second-period indifferent consumer is such that
C + a(x2)+ z + e
(
x∗1 + E [x2|2, v]
)− pA2 = C + e (2− (x∗1 + E [x2|2, v]))− pB2 ,
where E [x|2, v] denotes the estimate of random variable x by a second-
period consumer who has observed realization v (·). Thus, the second-
period demand curve equals
x2 = p
B
2 − pA2 + z + 2eE [x2|2, v]+ t − 2e+ 2ex∗1
2t
, (B.3)
which yields
E [x2|2, v] = p
B
2 − pA2 + E[z|2, v]+ t − 2e+ 2ex∗1
2 (t − e) . (B.4)
Substituting (B.4) in (B.3), we obtain
x2 = p
B
2 − pA2 + z + t − 2e+ 2ex∗1
2 (t − e) +
eE [z|2, v]− ez
2t (t − e) .
We need to compute the expected value of x2 by first-period consumers:
x˜2 = E [x2|1, v] =
E
[
pB2 |1, v
]
− E
[
pA2 |1, v
]
+ E [z|1, v]+ t − 2e+ 2ex˜1
2 (t − e)
+eE [E [z|2, v] |1, v]− eE [z|1, v]
2t (t − e) , (B.5)
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where, from (6) in the main text, we have
E
[
pA2 |1, v
]
= 1
3
E [z|1, v]+ t + 2
3
ex˜1 − 43e (B.6)
E
[
pB2 |1, v
]
= −1
3
E [z|1, v]+ t − 2
3
e− 2
3
ex˜1. (B.7)
By solving the equation system formed by equations (B.2), (B.5), (B.6) and
(B.7), we conclude that
x˜1 (E [z|1, v] , E [E [z|2, v] |1, v])
and
x˜2 (E [z|1, v] , E [E [z|2, v] |1, v]) .
By replacing these expressions in (B.1), we obtain
x1 = p
B
1 − pA1 + z + t − 2e+ 2ex˜1 (E [z|1, v] , E [E [z|2, v] |1, v])
2t
+2ex˜2 (E [z|1, v] , E [E [z|2, v] |1, v])
2t
.
Appendix C shows that E [z|1, v] = E [z] = 0 for a first-period indiffer-
ent consumer in a symmetric equilibrium, a fact known to second-period
consumers. Thus, we have
x1 = p
B
1 − pA1 + z + t − 2e+ 2e {x˜1 (E [E [z|2, v] |1])+ x˜2 (E [E [z|2, v] |1])}
2t
,
where we have simplified the notation by writing E [E [z|2, v] |1, v] simply
as E [E [z|2, v] |1] for a first-period indifferent consumer who acts based
on the posterior E [z|1, v] = E [z] = 0.
The only variables determining x1 whose values are unknown are z and
E [E [z|2, v] |1]. We can thus write:
z (x1, E [E [z|2, v] |1]) . (B.8)
In order to estimate the value of z after observing x∗1 , second-period con-
sumers first need to estimate the value of E [E [z|2, v] |1]. In fact,
E [z|2, v] = E [z (x∗1 , E [E [z|2, v] |1]) |2, v]
becomes
E [z|2, v] = z (x∗1 , E [E [E [z|2, v] |1] |2, v]) , (B.9)
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since x∗1 is observable by second-period consumers, they understand how
z (x1, E [E [z|2, v] |1]) is formed, and z is monotone in E [E [z|2, v] |1, v],
as inspection of (B.5) immediately shows.
We rule out equilibria based on E [E [E [z|2, v] |1] |2, v] ≠ E [E [z|2, v] |1].
In plain words, we rule out equilibria based on first-period indifferent con-
sumers forming beliefs on how second-period consumers estimate z which
second-period consumers misunderstand even though they possess all the
information which first-period indifferent consumers had at the time they
formed their beliefs. Then, from (B.8) and (B.9), we have E [z|2, v] = z, i.e.,
second-period consumers deduce the true value of z after observing x∗1 .
The same argument holds for firms in the second period.
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Appendix C
Determination of E [z|v]
From
v = a+ z
z U (−w,w)
a U (−t, t) ,
we have that v is itself a random variable with support [−t −w, t +w].
Moreover, it was also assumed that t > w.
Divide the support of v in three intervals.
(i) Intermediate values: v ∈ [−t +w, t −w].
When v ∈ [−t +w, t −w], for a given value of v , variable z can assume
all values in the interval [−w,w] . Also, for a given value of v , to each value
of z corresponds a unique value of a.19 Since a and z are both uniformly
distributed random variables, we conclude that for each value of v , variable
z can assume all values in its support with the same probability. Therefore,
the density function of z, given the realization of v , is
f [z|v] = 1
w − (−w), −w ≤ z ≤ w.
Thus, the posterior density function of z once a given value of v (xi, z) has
been observed, equals the prior density function of z:
E [z|v] = E [z] = 0.
For intermediate values of v , consumers cannot infer anything new about
the expected value of z by observing their own relative valuation of the two
networks as given by v .
In the extreme cases—high or low values of v—consumers can infer
something about the expected value of z by observing their own relative
valuation of the two networks. For instance, if a consumer observes a high
value of v , it infers that this value cannot be associated with a low value of
z and so the posterior expected value of z exceeds zero.
19To see this, consider the following example. If v = 0, then z = w ⇒ a = −w, and
z = 0 ⇒ a = 0, and z = −w ⇒ a = w.
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(ii) High values: v ∈ [t −w, t +w].
If v ∈ [t −w, t +w], then variable z cannot assume all values in
[−w,w]. In particular, z cannot assume values towards the low end of
its support, its posterior expected value no longer being zero but exceed-
ing it, instead. For a given value of v ∈ [t −w, t +w], z can assume values
in the interval [v − t,w]. Thus, the density function of variable z, given
the realization of v , is
f [z|v] = 1
w − (v − t) , v − t ≤ z ≤ w.
Therefore, the posterior expected value of z equals
E [z|v] = w + (v − t)
2
.
Therefore, E [z|v] can assume values between 0 (when v = t −w) and w
(when v = t +w).
(iii) Low values: v ∈ [−t −w,−t +w].
Similar computations yield
f [z|v] = 1
v + t − (−w), −w ≤ z ≤ v + t,
and
E [z|v] = v + t + (−w)
2
.
Therefore, E [z|v] can assume values between −w (for v = −t −w) and 0
(for v = −t +w).
First-period demand curve as a function of E [z|v]
For intermediate values of v , i.e., v ∈ [−t +w, t −w], we have E [z|v]
= 0. Then, (10) collapses to
x1 = 12 +
z
2t
+ 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 .
For high values of v , i.e., v ∈ [t −w, t +w], we have E [z|v] = w+(v−t)2
which, replaced in (10), yields
x1 = 12 +
z
2t
+ 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 +
(v +w − t) e (2t − e)
2t (3t2 − 6te+ 2e2) .
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For low values of v , i.e., v ∈ [−t −w,−t +w], we have E [z|v] =
v+t+(−w)
2 which, replaced in (10), yields
x1 = 12 +
z
2t
+ 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 +
(v + t −w)e (2t − e)
2t (3t2 − 6te+ 2e2) .
First-period demand curve
We now show that a first-period indifferent consumer has E [z|v] = 0 and
thus x1 = 12 + z2t + 32
(t−e)(pB1−pA1 )
3t2−6te+2e2 is the first-period demand function.
Take any realization of z, say, z. By definition, v = z + a, a ∈ [−t, t]
and z ∈ [−w,w]. This, together with the assumption t > w, implies that
∃x1,0 < x1 < 1 : z + a(x1) = 0. Thus, for such a consumer located at
x1, we have v = 0 ∈ [−t +w, t −w]. From the first subsection of this
appendix, this implies E [z|v] = E [z] = 0.
Moreover, from (8) and (9), we have
x˜1 = 12 +
3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ E [z|v]
(
t − 23e
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2
x˜2 = 12 +
1
2
e
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ E [z|v] t
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 ,
which, for a symmetric equilibrium and a consumer such that E [z|v] = 0,
implies x˜1 = x˜2 = 12 . Thus, such a consumer fulfills the equality C +
v (a (x1) , z) + e (x˜1 + x˜2) − pA1 = C + e (2− (x˜1 + x˜2)) − pB1 . Consumers
slightly to the right of x1 such that x1 > x1 while v ∈ [−t +w, t −w]
strictly prefer network B because v < 0 and x˜1 = x˜2 = 12 . Consumers
further to the right such that x1 > x1 and v ∈ [−t −w,−t +w] strictly
prefer network B because v < 0 and x˜1 = x˜2 < 12 . A similar argument
establishes that consumers to the left of x1 strictly prefer network A.
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Appendix D
In this appendix we analyze a model similar in almost all respects to the
one in the main text while assuming that the relative valuation of the two
networks, z, can change over time. We thus now define variables vj(·) as
the sum of two random variables: a(·) and zj, j = 1,2. We assume that
z1 and z2 are independent so that nothing can be inferred about z2 after
agents infer the realization of z1. Summarizing,
vj
(
xi, zj
)
= a(xi)+ zj
a (xi) = t − 2txi
xi U (0,1)⇒ a U (−t, t)
zj  U (−w,w) j = 1,2.
The first-period demand is similar to the one obtained in the main text:
x1 = p
B
1 − pA1 + z1 + t − 2e+ 2e (x˜1 + x˜2)
2t
. (D.1)
The expected demand is obtained as in the main text:
x˜1 = p
B
1 − pA1 + E [z1|v1]+ t − 2e+ 2ex˜2
2 (t − e) . (D.2)
The second-period demand function is determined as in the main text, ex-
cept that now the realization of z2 is unknown at the beginning of the
second period:
x2 = p
B
2 − pA2 + z2 + t − 2e+ 2ex∗1 + 2eE [x2|v2]
2t
. (D.3)
The second-period demand expected by a second-period consumer with
valuation v2 equals
E [x2|v2] = p
B
2 − pA2 + E [z2|v2]+ t − 2e+ 2ex∗1 + 2eE [x2|v2]
2t
.
Thus,
E [x2|v2] = p
B
2 − pA2 + E [z2|v2]+ t − 2e+ 2ex∗1
2 (t − e) . (D.4)
From (D.3), the second-period demand expected by a first-period consumer
with valuation v1 is
x˜2 = E [x2|v1] =
E
[
pB2 |v1
]
− E
[
pA2 |v1
]
+ E [z2|v1]
2t
+
+t − 2e+ 2ex˜1 + 2eE [E [x2|v2] |v1]
2t
,
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which simplifies to
x˜2 = E [x2|v1] =
E
[
pB2 |v1
]
− E
[
pA2 |v1
]
+ t − 2e+ 2ex˜1
2t
+
+2eE [E [x2|v2] |v1]
2t
, (D.5)
because E [z2|v1] = 0 since z1 and z2 are independent. From (D.4), we have
E [E [x2|v2] |v1] =
E
[
pB2 |v1
]
− E
[
pA2 |v1
]
+ E [E [z2|v2] |v1]+ t − 2e+ 2ex˜1
2 (t − e) .
One has E [E [z2|v2] |v1] = E [z2|v2] since z1 and z2 are independent.
Moreover, as shown in Appendix C for first-period indifferent consumers,
second-period indifferent consumers are such that E [z2|v2] = E [z2] = 0.
Thus, we have
E [E [x2|v2] |v1] =
E
[
pB2 |v1
]
− E
[
pA2 |v1
]
+ t − 2e+ 2ex˜1
2 (t − e) ,
which, replaced in (D.5), yields
x˜2 =
E
[
pB2 |v1
]
− E
[
pA2 |v1
]
+ t − 2e+ 2ex˜1
2 (t − e) . (D.6)
Second-period firms do not know the realization of z2 and act on the basis
of its expected value, namely 0. Moreover, as said above, firms know that
second-period demand is determined by consumers such that E [z2|v2] =
E [z2] = 0, i.e., by consumers whose posterior expectation of z2 equals the
prior and thus coincides with firms’ expectation of this variable. Thus, by
replacing (D.4) in (D.3) while bearing in mind that E [z2|v2] = E [z2] = 0,
we obtain the expected second-period demand faced by firm A, which we
denote by E [x2]:
E [x2] = p
B
2 − pA2 + t − 2e+ 2ex∗1
2 (t − e) . (D.7)
The profit maximization problem of firm A in the second period is
Max
pA2
E
[
pA2 x2N
]
.
Since pA2 is not a random variable, we can write
Max
pA2
pA2 E [x2]N = pA2
pB2 − pA2 + t − 2e+ 2ex∗1
2 (t − e) N.
The f.o.c. equals
pB2 − pA2 + t − 2e+ 2ex∗1
2 (t − e) N − p
A
2
1
2 (t − e)N = 0 
pB2 + t − 2e+ 2ex∗1 = 2pA2 .
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The s.o.c. equals
− 1
t − e < 0.
By symmetry, we have for firm B
pA2 + t − 2ex∗1 = 2pB2 .
We can now solve the system of equations encompassing the first-order
conditions, obtaining 

pA2 = t + 23ex∗1 − 43e
pB2 = t − 23e− 23ex∗1 .
(D.8)
First-period consumers must determine the expected value of these prices:
E
[
pA2 |v1
]
= t + 2
3
ex˜1 − 43e
E
[
pB2 |v1
]
= t − 2
3
e− 2
3
ex˜1.
By replacing them in (D.6), we obtain
x˜2 =
t − 43e+ 23ex˜1
2 (t − e) . (D.9)
By substituting (D.9) in (D.2), we obtain
x˜1 = 12 +
3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ (t − e)E [z1|v1]
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 . (D.10)
By replacing (D.10) in (D.9), we obtain
x˜2 = 12 +
1
2
eE [z1|v1]+ e
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 . (D.11)
By replacing (D.10) and (D.11) in (D.1), we obtain
x1 = 12 +
z1
2t
+ 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 +
1
2
e (3t − 2e)E [z1|v1]
t (3t2 − 6te+ 2e2) .
As shown in Appendix C, in a symmetric equilibrium, the indifferent con-
sumers are such that E [z1|v1] = E [z1] = 0. So, the previous expression
collapses to
x1 = 12 +
z1
2t
+ 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 . (D.12)
By replacing (D.12) in (D.8), we obtain
pA2 = t − e+
1
3
ez1
t
+
e (t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 , (D.13)
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and
pB2 = t − e−
1
3
ez1
t
−
e (t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 . (D.14)
By replacing (D.12), (D.13) and (D.14) in (D.4), we obtain
E [x2|v2] = 12 +
1
3
ez1
t + E [z2|v2]+
e(t−e)(pB1−pA1 )
3t2−6te+2e2
2 (t − e) . (D.15)
By replacing (D.12), (D.13), (D.14) and (D.15) in (D.3), we obtain
x2 = 12 +
z1e
6t (t − e) +
z2
2t
+ 1
2
e
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 +
1
2t
E [z2|v2] e
t − e .
Again, as Appendix C shows, in a symmetric equilibrium, demand is such
that E [z2|v2] = E [z2] = 0. Thus, the previous expression collapses to
x2 = 12 +
z1e
6t (t − e) +
z2
2t
+ 1
2
e
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 . (D.16)
The second-period demand depends on the random variable z2 as well as
the random variable z1, due to the network effect.
The profit maximization problem of firm A is
Max
pA1
E
[
x1
(
pA1 , p
B
1
)
pA1 + x2
(
pA1 , p
B
1
)
pA2
]
N,
or
Max
pA1
E
[
x1
(
pA1 , p
B
1
)]
NpA1 + E
[
x2
(
pA1 , p
B
1
)
pA2
]
N.
Replacing (D.12), (D.13) and (D.16) in the profit maximization problem, we
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obtain
Max
pA1
E

1
2
+ z1
2t
+ 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2

NpA1 +
+E



1
2
+ z1e
6t (t − e) +
z2
2t
+ 1
2
e
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2

×
×

t − e+ 1
3
ez1
t
+
e (t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2



N =
=

1
2
+ 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2

NpA1 + E
[
1
2
(
t − e+ 1
3
ez1
t
)
+
+1
2
e (t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 +
(
z1e
6t (t − e) +
z2
2t
)(
t − e+ 1
3
ez1
t
)
+
+
(
z1e
6t (t − e) +
z2
2t
) e (t − e)(pB1 − pA1 )
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 +
+1
2
e
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2
(
t − e+ 1
3
ez1
t
)
+1
2
e
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2
e (t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2



N.
The f.o.c. equals
1
2
N + 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 N −
3
2
(t − e)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2p
A
1N −
1
2
e (t − e)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2N −
−1
2
e
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 (t − e)N −
1
2
e2 (t − e)2
(
pB1 − pA1
)
(3t2 − 6te+ 2e2)2 N = 0.
By symmetry, we have
1
2
− 3
2
t − e
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2p
A
1 −
e (t − e)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 = 0,
or
pA1 = t −
5
3
e− 1
3
e2
t − e .
Thus, equilibrium first-period prices are the same as in the main text. As
to the s.o.c., we have
(t − e) −3
(
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2)+ e2
(3t2 − 6te+ 2e2)2 ,
which is negative if t > 53e, a restriction we now retain.
From (D.12) and (D.16), in a symmetric equilibrium, demand equals
x1 = 12 +
z1
2t
x2 = 12 +
z1e
6t (t − e) +
z2
2t
.
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If z1 = z2 > 0, and since t > e, than x1 < x2. Thus, if the average relative
valuation of the two networks is the same in both periods, i.e., if z1 = z2,
the firm with the larger market share in the first period will always increase
it in the following period.
We now consider another particular realization of the common terms
such that in the first period, firm A is the preferred one, i.e. z1 = K > 0,
whereas in the second period the symmetric case occurs, z2 = −K. In the
first period, firms charge the same price, and so the market share of A
equals
x1 = 12 +
1
2
K
t
.
In the second-period, z2 = −K < 0, and A’s market share equals
x2 = 12 +
Ke
6t (t − e) −
1
2
K
t
.
When considering the two periods jointly, A always obtains a larger market
share iff e > 0:
x1 + x2 > 1  12 +
1
2
K
t
+ 1
2
+ Ke
6t (t − e) −
1
2
K
t
> 1 
Ke
6t (t − e) > 0.
Thus, there is always a first-mover advantage in market-wide preferences
whenever network effects are felt.
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Appendix E
In this appendix we develop a model similar to the one in the main text but
for the fact that random variable z is no longer unknown in the first period.
The first-period demand function is determined as in the main text. The
only difference is that now the exact value of z is common knowledge:
x1 = p
B
1 − pA1 + z + t − 2e+ 2e (x˜1 + x˜2)
2t
.
The expected value of x1 is now equal to its actual value, i.e., x1 = x˜1:
x1 = p
B
1 − pA1 + z + t − 2e+ 2e (x1 + x˜2)
2t
= p
B
1 − pA1 + z + t − 2e+ 2ex˜2
2 (t − e) . (E.1)
The second-period demand function and prices are determined as in the
main text:
x2 = p
B
2 − pA2 + z + t − 2e+ 2ex1
2 (t − e) (E.2)
pA2 =
1
3
z + t + 2
3
ex1 − 43e. (E.3)
pB2 = −
1
3
z + t − 2
3
e− 2
3
ex1 (E.4)
In contrast to the main text, since z is known from the outset, the expec-
tations of x2, pB2 and p
A
2 are equal to their actual value. By replacing (E.3)
and (E.4) in (E.2), we obtain
x2 =
1
3z + t − 43e+ 23ex1
2 (t − e) . (E.5)
By substituting (E.5) in (E.1), bearing in mind that x˜2 = x2, we obtain:
x1 = 12 +
3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ z
(
t − 23e
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 . (E.6)
By substituting (E.6) in (E.5), we obtain:
x2 = 12 +
1
2
e
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ zt
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 . (E.7)
By substituting (E.6) in (E.3) and (E.4), we obtain:
pA2 =
1
3
z + t − e+
e (t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ ez
(
t − 23e
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 ,
and
pB2 = −
1
3
z + t − e−
e (t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ ez
(
t − 23e
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 .
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The first-period profit-maximization problem of firm A is
Max
pA1
(
x1
(
pA1 , p
B
1
)
pA1 + x2
(
pA1 , p
B
1
)
pA2
)
N,
or
Max
pA1

1
2
+ 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ z
(
t − 23e
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2

NpA1 +
+

1
2
+ 1
2
e
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ zt
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2

×
×

1
3
z + t − e+
e (t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ ez
(
t − 23e
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2

N.
The f.o.c. equals
1
2
54pA1 t2e− 46pA1 te2 − 27pB1 t2e+ 22pB1 te2 − 26zt2e+ 20zte2 + 9t4 + 8e4
(3t2 − 6te+ 2e2)2 +
+1
2
−18pA1 t3 + 10pA1 e3 − 42t3e+ 66t2e2 − 40te3 + 9pB1 t3 − 4pB1e3 + 9zt3 − 4ze3
(3t2 − 6te+ 2e2)2 = 0.
The second derivative equals
−−27t
2e+ 23te2 + 9t3 − 5e3
(3t2 − 6te+ 2e2)2 =
−3t + e
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2 +
e2 (e− t)
(3t2 − 6te+ 2e2)2 .
As in the main text, one must have t > 1.577e in order to have a unique and
stable equilibrium without full bunching on one network. For t > 1.577e,
the expression immediately above is negative, ensuring that the s.o.c. is
verified.
The problem faced by firm B is
Max
pB1
(
1− x1
(
pA1 , p
B
1
))
NpB1 +
(
1− x2
(
pA1 , p
B
1
))
NpB2 ,
or
Max
pB1

1
2
− 3
2
(t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ z
(
t − 23e
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2

NpB1 +
+

1− 1
2
− 1
2
e
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ zt
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2

×
×

−1
3
z + t − e−
e (t − e)
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ ez
(
t − 23e
)
3t2 − 6te+ 2e2

N.
The f.o.c. for firms B’s problem equals
−1
2
27pA1 t2e− 22pA1 te2 − 54pB1 t2e+ 46pB1 te2 − 26zt2e+ 20zte2 − 9t4 − 8e4
(3t2 − 6te+ 2e2)2 −
−1
2
−9pA1 t3 + 4pA1 e3 + 42t3e− 66t2e2 + 40te3 + 18pB1 t3 − 10pB1e3 + 9zt3 − 4ze3
(3t2 − 6te+ 2e2)2 = 0.
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Solving the system of equations formed by the two first-order conditions,
we obtain the optimal prices charged in the first period:
pB1 = −
1
3
56e4 − 328te3 + 12ze3 − 60zte2 + 582t2e2 − 378t3e+ 78zt2e− 27zt3 + 81t4
(e− t) (14e2 − 54te+ 27t2)
pA1 = −
1
3
56e4 − 328te3 − 12ze3 + 60zte2 + 582t2e2 − 378t3e− 78zt2e+ 27zt3 + 81t4
(e− t) (14e2 − 54te+ 27t2) .
By replacing these in (E.6) and (E.7), we obtain
x1 = 12 +
1
2
9zt − 2ez
14e2 − 54te+ 27t2
x2 = 12 +
1
2
−4e2z + 15ezt − 9zt2
(e− t) (14e2 − 54te+ 27t2) .
If z > 0, x1 and x2 exceed 12 as was to be expected. Moreover, x2 > x1 if
and only if t ∈ (1,577e,1.694e).
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